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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the role of social groups in explaining the reaction to control. 
We propose a simple model with a principal using control devices and a controlled 
agent, which incorporates the existence of social groups. Testing experimentally the 
conjectures derived from the model and related literature, we find that agents in social 
groups (i) perform more than other (no-group) agents; (ii) expect less control than 
no-group agents; (iii) decrease their performance substantially when actual control 
exceeds their expectation, while no-group agents do not react; (iv) do not reciprocate 
when facing less control than expected, while no-group agents do. 
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Control is commonly used in employment relationships characterized by incomplete contracts
to eliminate workers’ most opportunistic actions. Standard principal-agent theory suggests that
imposing tight control on workers will increase their performance, as workers are merely self-
interested and shirking is frequent (Frey, 1993). This prediction has been challenged by a
number of empirical studies, which typically evidence that control can reduce worker eﬀort by
eroding intrinsic motivation (Barkema, 1995; Enzle and Anderson, 1993; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006;
Herzberg, 1986; Schnedler and Vadovic, 2007).1 However, we argue that these hidden costs of
control, but also the beneﬁts of control, depend on the nature of the relationship between the
principal and the agent. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton provide case-study results
from the U.S. steel industry that are consistent with this view; they conclude that “[w]hat
matters is not more or less monitoring per se, but how employees think of themselves in relation
to the ﬁrm” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2008, p. 212).
This paper investigates how belonging to a social group aﬀects the behavioral reaction to
control. We contribute to the previous literature by proposing an analytical framework that
incorporates social identity (in the sense of Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005) into a simple
principal-agent model.2 In the model, the agent decides how much eﬀort to exert on behalf of
the principal. The principal can restrict the agent’s choice set by imposing a minimum eﬀort
requirement that the agent is not allowed to fall short of.3 We distinguish between two general
types of principal-agent relationships to account for social identity in the model: in-group and
no-group (Tajfel, 1970). Individuals in in-group relationships identify at least partly with each
other and behave in accordance with the social identity based on that group membership. No-
group individuals are strangers to each other.4 The theoretical discussion delivers three main
insights: First, social identity inﬂuences both the agent’s willingness to perform on behalf of
the principal and his subjective expectations of the appropriate level of control. Second, the
eﬀort exerted by the agent is primarily determined by the control sensation, which we deﬁne as
1 See Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), Sliwka (2007), and von Siemens (2011) for theoretical investigations of
the mechanisms underlying motivational crowding-out.
2 The literature on social psychology suggests that the emergence of social identity is facilitated by interpersonal
interactions, although they are not necessary for identiﬁcation to occur (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Tajfel, 1978).
As will be elaborated below, group formation in our paper is quasi-minimal, meaning that group membership
is induced by an interaction between individuals instead of being the result of simply assigning an arbitrary
label. In the remainder of the paper, we will use the notions of social identity, group identity, and social group
interchangeably.
3 As Falk and Kosfeld (2006), we argue that the minimum eﬀort restriction implemented by the principal is the
equivalent of employing control devices in the agent’s work environment.
4 For the ease of illustration, we abstract from formally modeling the intensity of in-group members’ identiﬁcation
with each other and instead apply a categorical classiﬁcation. In the experiment, however, we are to some
extent able to control for the degree of group identiﬁcation through a question after the group formation stage.
1the deviation of the agent’s subjective control belief from the level of control imposed by the
principal. Third, the agent’s behavioral reaction to sensation is a function of social identity.
We conduct a labor market experiment to test these behavioral conjectures.5 The experi-
ment proceeds in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, group formation takes place. Focusing on social
identity based on a shared experience, we create a trust-based relationship between subjects in
the in-group treatment through a weakest-link game with computer-mediated pre-play commu-
nication. Subjects in the no-group treatment complete a task in isolation. In the second stage,
we elicit the agent’s eﬀort for each of the three control levels the principal can choose between
using the strategy method (Selten, 1967). In the third stage, agents are remunerated for per-
forming a real-eﬀort task. Before the game begins, they must decide how much of their future
remuneration they are willing to share with the principal. Agents receive information on the
minimum share required by the principal before making their sharing decision and completing
the task. Thus, the real-eﬀort game allows us to study the inﬂuence of an experienced control
sensation on the behavior of the subjects.
We ﬁnd that social identity has belief- and performance-related consequences. In-group
agents expect lower levels of control than no-group agents and are, for each control level, more
willing to exert eﬀort beyond the required minimum (voluntary performance). Moreover, we
observe that both types of agents increase their voluntary performance in the level of sensation.
However, there are important intergroup diﬀerences when taking into account the direction of the
sensation. For negative sensations, where the level of control the agent faces exceeds his control
belief, in-group agents decrease voluntary sharing substantially. No-group agents, however, do
not react to negative sensations. Having experienced a positive sensation, where the experienced
level of control falls short of the agent’s control belief, in-group agents act less favorably than
their no-group counterparts. Thus, in the polar cases of maximum and minimum sensation, the
intergroup diﬀerences in the levels of eﬀort chosen nearly vanish.
Our results imply that the stimulating impact of social identity on the agent’s performance
depends on the latter’s appraisal of the principal’s control decision. If the agent feels that the
principal does not act in accordance with the social identity based on their group membership, he
appears to be inclined to punish this behavior. In extreme cases, this can completely outweigh
the beneﬁts of social identity. When we extrapolate our ﬁndings to situations in which the
principal can choose even higher levels of control, identity salience can easily backﬁre on the
principal, reducing an in-group agent’s willingness to perform in the principal’s interest below
that of a no-group agent. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that investigates the
role of subjective control beliefs in determining the agents’ reactions to control. In particular, we
show that social identity inﬂuences both the formation of beliefs over control and the response
5 Our experimental design builds on Falk and Kosfeld (2006) but extends it in a number of important ways.
2to deviations of expected from actually experienced control.
Our research is inspired by an empirical study carried out by Barkema (1995). He was the
ﬁrst to document a correlation between social distance and the reaction to monitoring. Using
survey data of 116 executives of Dutch ﬁrms, he ﬁnds that higher monitoring is associated
with fewer working hours if managers are supervised by an in-house CEO. But if monitoring is
implemented impersonally by a parent company, the correlation between monitoring and hours
worked is positive. However, using real-world data to assess the behavioral consequences of
monitoring as a function of social distance is problematic because it requires intimate knowledge
of the nature of the principal-agent relationship. To establish a causal eﬀect, one would have to
consider a myriad of aspects, for example, personal characteristics, economic dependency on the
job, organizational tenure, recency of membership in the organization, informal organizational
structure, and the existence of multiple foci of identiﬁcation.6 These factors inﬂuence both
group identity and performance; hence, endogeneity resulting from omitted variables is a serious
concern when these variables are not properly controlled for. Therefore, we took an experimental
approach to test our theoretical conjectures in a controlled environment.7
Closely related to our work is the experiment conducted by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), who
show that control can yield costs that outweigh the beneﬁts when dealing with reciprocal agents,
as reciprocity is sensitive to control. However, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) do not account for
social ties between the principal and the agent in their analysis, and thus neglect how these
may increase or undermine motivation. Dickinson and Villeval (2008), testing the theoretical
conjectures made by Frey (1993) in a real-eﬀort experiment, ﬁnd that tighter monitoring by
the principal crowds out the agent’s eﬀort primarily if the principal and the agent are socially
close. The authors, however, vary social distance by lifting anonymity. With this design, various
confounding factors are conceivable, such as feelings of sympathy or antipathy evoked as the
result of close, uncontrolled, and direct communication between the subjects (Dufwenberg and
6 Multiple group memberships are prevalent in real-world organizations (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth
and Mael, 1989; Van Knippenberg and Van Schie, 2000). For instance, an employee’s social identity may be
derived not only from the ﬁrm as a whole but also, for instance, from his department, union, or team, with
potentially diﬀerent (and unobservable) norms, values, goals, and performance standards.
7 A further virtue of our lab experiment is that we can clearly distinguish between “task performance” and
“contextual performance.” The former refers to eﬀorts that are part of the ”usual” job requirements. The
latter relates to one’s other eﬀorts in the environment in which task performance takes place, encompassing
behaviors such as helping others and taking others’ interests into account (Moorman, 1991; Moorman and
Blakely, 1995). In our view, contextual performance is a more appropriate indicator of the eﬀects that group
identity has on eﬀort because the agent is not required to engage in contextual eﬀorts. Task performance,
however, relates to performance on the job the agent was hired to do. Because the agent is likely to beneﬁt
from it in the form of bonus payments or promotion opportunities (Van Knippenberg, 2000), task performance
is less contingent on the motivations that correspond to group membership. In the experiment, each principal-
agent game is designed as a one-shot interaction, and all of the eﬀort conducted on behalf of the principal
is foregone by the agent. Consequently, the agent does not have any strategic incentive to voluntarily exert
eﬀort.
3Muren, 2006; Goette, Huﬀman and Meier, 2011). In contrast to Dickinson and Villeval (2008),
control and eﬀort decisions in our experiment are made anonymously. Subjects in the in-group
treatment only know that they have interacted with the other player before, but receive no other
identifying information. Keeping anonymity allows us to isolate the eﬀect of group membership
on the agent’s willingness to exert eﬀort for the principal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
modeling framework and derive predictions. Section 3 explains the experimental design, which
is followed by a discussion of our results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes by providing the
implications of our ﬁndings.
2 The Modeling Framework
2.1 Sensation-Dependent Preferences
In this section, we outline a modeling framework that we use to derive hypotheses on the belief-
and performance-related consequences of social identity. In the model, we consider a situation
in which the principal chooses a control level, m, that is observed by the agent before the latter
decides how much eﬀort to expend on behalf of the principal. We denote the level of control that
the agent expects by ˆ m. Further, we assume that the agent’s utility depends on the magnitude
of the deviation of the expected degree of control from the actually experienced one, that is,
ˆ m − m. We refer to this deviation as the level of sensation.
Let the agent’s utility be composed of three components (Akerlof and Kranton, 2008). First,
the agent receives a constant wage, w, with his utility increasing in the level of w. Second, the
agents exerts an eﬀort of e, which causes a positive and non-decreasing marginal dis-utility. In
other words, we assume that the costs of eﬀort have the following form: f0(e) > 0 and f00(e) = 0.
Third, and most importantly, the term g((ˆ m − m),e) deﬁnes the utility eﬀect of a sensation.
The utility function of the agent then reads:
UA(e;m) =lnw − f(e) + g((ˆ m − m),e) (1)
This formulation of the agent’s utility captures the relationship between overall satisfaction
with a task or job and social identity (Dick et al., 2004). In fact, UA(e;m) can be regarded as
the general attitude toward the task the agent has to perform, which stems from sources such
as pay satisfaction, lnw, speciﬁc task characteristics, f(e), and the (dis)utility stemming from
positive or negative control sensations (regarding the latter, see also Koszegi and Rabin, 2006).
4Sensation as a driver for behavior Let us deﬁne ∆ ≡ ˆ m−m as the diﬀerence between the
agent’s individually expected and actually experienced degrees of control, which captures the
level of sensation.8 Assuming that the wage payment and eﬀort dis-utility are independent of
social identity, we can abstract from lnw and f(e) in what follows. The agent’s utility is then
determined by the sensation term only, and (1) reduces to:
U
reduced
A (e;m) =g(∆,e) (2)
We further assume that the sensation term in (2) satisﬁes the following properties:
Assumption 1. g(∆,e) is continuous for all ∆ ∈ R and e≥ 0, and twice diﬀerentiable
for e and for ∆ 6= 0.







The ﬁrst part of Assumption 2 means that, ceteris paribus, the agent’s utility increases in
the level of sensation; the larger the diﬀerence between the expected and experienced control,
the higher the agent’s utility. The second part of Assumption 2 reﬂects the idea that, for a
given level of sensation, reciprocity increases in eﬀort. The intuition for this assumption can
be seen from the following example. Suppose that there are two agents, Adam and Eve. Eve
is willing to work hard and expects little control. Adam also expects a low control level, but
he is not willing to work as hard as Eve. Let both Adam and Eve face high levels of control
and experience the same kind of negative sensation. Our assumption is that this sensation will
disappoint the hard-working Eve more (or at least not less) than the rather lazy Adam, so her
utility decreases at least as much as Adam’s does.
Assumption 3 establishes that the positive eﬀort-dependence of g(•) decreases in the level
of eﬀort. If this were not the case, the optimization calculus for the agent would be trivial,
as he would always choose the maximum possible eﬀort.9 Assumption 4 demonstrates how the
eﬀect that sensation has on utility changes in the level of eﬀort. We assume that the higher the
agent’s willingness to work the more pronounced the utility-enhancing eﬀect of any sensation.
8 In the results section, we will deﬁne the empirical equivalent of sensation.
9 Recall that we neglect direct costs of eﬀort.
5Put diﬀerently, the more ready an agent is to expend eﬀort, the more sensitive he is to the
behavior of the principal and the stronger the utility eﬀect of sensations.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
The agent maximizes (2) w.r.t. e s.t. e > m, where m is the control choice of the principal,
which the agent takes as given.10 We solve the agent’s optimization problem in Appendix A and
derive the following conjectures concerning the behavior of the agent:
Conjecture 1. Due to the existence of two equilibria, we may observe agents who do not exert
any eﬀort beyond the minimum requirement set by the principal, that is, e = m. However, we
also expect to observe agents with a positive level of voluntarily expended eﬀort, that is, e > m.
Conjecture 2. For any positive eﬀort increment, e > m, eﬀort increases in the level of sensa-
tion.
Conjectures 1 and 2 are the result of the agent’s optimization calculus when abstracting from
group identity. Therefore, both conjectures refer to the eﬀort responses to control or sensation
within groups. However, the model can easily be extended to incorporate intergroup diﬀerences
as well. To allow us to formally distinguish between in-group and no-group agents, we introduce
the parameter c ∈ {0,1}, where c = 1 identiﬁes an in-group relationship and c = 0 identiﬁes a
no-group relationship. We think of in-group and no-group agents as being diﬀerent in several
dimensions.
First, social identity theory (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Tajfel, 1978) implies that the level of
eﬀort exerted for the principal depends on the nature of the principal-agent relationship, that is,
e = e(c). Early laboratory experiments ﬁnd that simply assigning an individual to a group can
be suﬃcient to induce in-group favoritism (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Brewer, 1979), which has
been conﬁrmed by more recent studies (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009; Goette, Huﬀman and Meier,
2011). Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) report that expecting their partners to be trustworthy
impacts the participants’ likelihood to cooperate in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas. Likewise,
using observational data, Porta et al. (1997) document for a cross section of countries that trust
10Note that the participation constraint always binds by assumption. Therefore, our model is highly applicable
to employment in the public sector or large organizations with high ”sunk utility costs” (for example, due
to job security and the right to a pension). The previous literature has also demonstrated that public sector
employees have certain personal characteristics that make working in the public domain preferable over working
in the private sector. It has been found that, compared to private employees, public employees are more
risk averse (Falk, 2010) and more concerned with status than with money (Rainey, 1983; Warwick, 1980).
Moreover, employees in the public sector perceive the relationship between pay and performance as being
weaker (Buchanan, 1974, 1975; Ingraham, 1993; Perry, Petrakis and Miller, 1989; Rainey, 1983).
6matters for cooperation. Moreover, evidence from the public sector suggests that the social
distance between principals and agents is expected to directly aﬀect whether an agent shirks or
works (Chaney and Saltzstein, 1998; Scholz, 1991). Given these results, we modify Conjecture 1
to incorporate the intergroup diﬀerences in the inclination to exert eﬀort voluntarily as follows:
Conjecture 3. The proportion of in-group agents exceeding the minimum performance level set
by the principal is higher than the respective proportion of no-group agents.
Moreover, the above literature also suggests that in-group agents take on the group’s perspec-
tive and therefore supply more eﬀort in the principal’s interest than their no-group counterparts.
Conjecture 4. e(c = 1) > e(c = 0)
Second, various studies of decision-making in social contexts show that knowledge about
other persons’ personality features aﬀect expectations regarding their behavior (e.g., Delgado,
Frank and Phelps, 2005; Marchetti et al., 2011). This implies that the individually expected level
of control depends on social identity; thus, ˆ m = ˆ m(c). The discussion of reference point eﬀects
in Hart and Moore (2008) points out the direction of between-group diﬀerences in the control
beliefs. Applying their theory of contracts as reference points to our setting, principal-agent
pairs with a shared common experience conclude some kind of implicit contract, which aﬀects
expectations of the appropriate level of control. Because they expect their principals to be more
cooperative, in-group agents have lower control beliefs than no-group agents.
Conjecture 5. ˆ m(c = 1) < ˆ m(c = 0)
Finally, the model suggests that eﬀort, e, and sensation, ∆, are positively associated (see
Conjecture 2). This result should hold for both types of agents. However, there may be in-
tergroup diﬀerences in the performance response to sensation if the direction of the sensation
is accounted for. In the case of a negative sensation, ∆ < 0, we expect the decrease in the
willingness to perform in the principal’s interest to be more pronounced for in-group than for
no-group agents. Following Hart and Moore (2008), in-group agents might interpret a negative
sensation as the principal breaching the implicit contract. The agent, in turn, retaliates upon
the principal for this norm violation, a phenomenon that has been reported in the psychological
literature by Koehler and Gershoﬀ (2003) and Sanfey (2009). As discussed by Goette, Huﬀman
and Meier (2011), social ties between group members can be easily eliminated, and replaced with
a desire for sanctioning, if a group member’s behavior is seen as incongruent with the implied
group identity. The stronger the social ties within the group, the more pronounced the nega-
tive emotional reaction to group members not acting in accordance with their fellows’ beliefs or
norms.
7Conjecture 6. de
d∆(c = 1) > de
d∆(c = 0) for ∆ < 0
However, the previous literature does not provide clear guidance on whether intergroup
diﬀerences also exist for a positive sensation, ∆ > 0. Thus, we formulate Conjecture 7 in a
neutral way:
Conjecture 7. de
d∆(c = 1) Q de
d∆(c = 0) for ∆ > 0
It is important to note that our behavioral predictions diﬀer from those discussed in Akerlof
and Kranton (2005). They assume that strict supervision alters the nature of the principal-agent
relationship as an in-group relationship suddenly becomes a no-group relationship. In our model,
supervision or control does not aﬀect the type of the relationship between the principal and the
agent. Rather, a negative control sensation, possibly interpreted as a sign of distrust, evokes
even harsher negative feelings for the in-group agent. This may be a more realistic view of in-
group and no-group relationships, as positive experiences will neither be completely eliminated
by a negative experience nor will they return subjects to a state similar to having never shared
a common experience with each other. Rather, we think that the weight the agent attaches to
control sensations depends on the nature of the principal-agent relationship, as does the agent’s
behavioral reaction to them.
3 Experimental Design
In the experiment, subjects were divided into groups of two, and the roles of principal and agent
as well as the treatment were randomly assigned. The design was parsimonious, without work
environment frames. In the ﬁrst step we established groups in the in-group treatment. In the
no-group treatment, individuals performed a task in isolation. Then, to test Conjectures 1, 3,
4, and 5, all subjects played an eﬀort-choice game. Control was implemented by allowing the
principal to impose a minimum eﬀort restriction on the agent. The latter, without getting to
know the principal’s control decision, had to state the eﬀorts they were willing to exert for each
level of control the principal could choose. However, in light of the discussion in the previous
section, sensation only occurs in situations where the principal’s control decision is revealed to
the agent. Therefore, to additionally test Conjectures 2, 6, and 7, subjects played a real-eﬀort
game after the eﬀort-choice game, where the agent learned about the principal’s control decision
before making his performance choice. We now turn to a detailed explanation of the stages.11
11We also ran two pilot sessions with a total of 36 participants whose results are not reported here.
8Group-Formation Phase
In the group-formation phase, about half of the participants in the experiment played a weakest-
link game. Subjects could distribute 50 experimental currency units (ECU, where 1 ECU was
worth 0.10 €) to a private or public account. The returns to the group account were the smallest
of the two contributions to the public account, doubled by the experimenter. A subject’s total
payment was the sum of the private and group account. After an explanation of the game, a
message on a screen asked each group of two to discuss their strategy for this game via an online
chat.12 The aim of the this phase was to induce a feeling of belonging to the same group, as a
consequence of the shared principal-agent experience.13 The coordination game had an obvious
focal point, to ease the establishment of group feelings.14 We refer to the principal-agents pairs
that played the coordination game as in-group.
There was no competition among groups in the later stages of the experiment, nor did we
reveal the control and eﬀort choices made by the other principal-agent pairs to the subjects.
Although the social identity literature has demonstrated that salience of other group(s) and
competition among groups reinforce awareness of one’s group membership (Ashforth and Mael,
1989; Worchel et al., 1998), our goal was to investigate whether even quasi-minimal group induc-
tion, stemming only from a one-time interaction in the initial coordination game, is suﬃcient to
detect behavioral diﬀerences. However, our design captures more than a pure labeling eﬀect that
results from simply assigning people to certain groups. Rather, we also account for the social
ties aspect of groups that emerges from the shared common experience of the principal and the
agent and the knowledge of the other’s behavior.15 After the game and the disclosure of the
results, subjects had to give their partner feedback on how fair they found the other’s behavior.
The subjects could pick any natural number between 1 (very unfair) and 5 (very fair), but were
not allowed to further explain their opinion. Both partners received this feedback before the
next stage.
Subjects in the no-group treatment were asked to perform a slider task (developed by Gill
and Prowse, Forthcoming, slightly modiﬁed to ﬁt our design needs.). The challenge here was to
12To ensure anonymity, the participants were asked to only chat about the game. We checked the chat protocols
whether personal information was exchanged during the principal-agent interaction. It turned out that almost
all subjects, indeed, limited themselves to chat about the game. A pair of subjects, however, revealed their
identity during the chat. Because dropping these subjects from the sample leaves all results virtually unchanged,
we decided to keep them in our preferred sample.
13One of the factors that traditionally are associated with group formation is interpersonal interaction (for an
early reference, see McDougall, 1920).
14Techniques of group induction have long been used in social psychology (for example, Turner, 1981) but only
recently found their way into the experimental literature (among others, Heap and Zizzo, 2009).
15As evidenced by Goette, Huﬀman and Meier (2011), the additional motives arising when group induction
is not minimal are important determinants of individual behavior, especially with regard to the response to
within-group norm violations.
9bring 48 sliders into the middle position within 3 minutes. Participants in this task received a
ﬂat fee of 80 ECU, independent of their performance.16
Eﬀort-Choice Phase
The eﬀort-choice game was designed as a modiﬁed version of the experiment conducted by Falk
and Kosfeld (2006). Before the game, subjects were informed about their assigned roles as
principal or agent. Each agent had an initial endowment of E = 1,2,...,117, where e ∈ E
represents the total eﬀort exerted by the agent. The marginal monetary costs for the agent to
expend 1 unit of eﬀort were constant and set to 1. The principal had no initial endowment.
The amount transferred to him by the agent was doubled by the experimenter so that the
principal received πP = 2e. The principal could restrict the agent’s choice set by enforcing one
of the following three minimum transfers: Emin ∈ {0,6,21}. We chose those control levels to
investigate what a small (relative to the endowment) increase in control triggers in the agent.
Agents played this game using the strategy vector method. They had to decide on eﬀorts for
all possible minimum eﬀort levels without knowing the principal’s actual decision. We refer to
voluntary sharing as the diﬀerence between the agent’s eﬀort choice and the principal’s control.
Although we are not able to test all of the theoretical conjectures developed in Section 2,
the eﬀort-choice game still has a raison d’être. First and foremost, it allows for comparisons
to previous studies on the costs of control, most notably Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Ploner,
Schmelz and Ziegelmeyer (Forthcoming). Second, the strategy vector method enables us to elicit
diﬀerences in the agents’ eﬀort choices for a small (relative to a large) increase in the degree of
control. Finally, we want to investigate whether social identity is salient in both cold and hot
decision-making situations.
Real-Eﬀort Phase
After the eﬀort-choice game, the participants played a real-eﬀort game. Here, the agents had
to add ﬁve two-digit numbers (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), and the remuneration depended
on the number of correct answers. Before the agent started the task, he had to decide what
share of his payoﬀ to transfer to the principal.17 Because, again, the principal had no initial
endowment, the agent’s transfer was the only source of income for the principal in this game.
The principal could choose his desired level of control from the following possibilities: Emin ∈
1680 ECU were the average payoﬀ of in-group principals and agents, respectively, in the pilot sessions.
17At this stage, the agent already knew that the real-eﬀort task would be to solve summations. The agent’s
sharing decision may thus depend on his (perceived) numeracy skills. However, this is unlikely to aﬀect our
results on intergroup diﬀerences in voluntary sharing because, as a result of randomization, groups should not
systematically diﬀer in their number-adding skills.
10{0%,10%,20%,40%}. The agent was free to transfer a larger share to the principal than the
latter requested as minimum, while the transfer was not doubled. The agent received 10 ECU
for each sum correctly solved.
Although Bruggen and Strobel (2007) ﬁnd no diﬀerence in eﬀort-choice and real-eﬀort games
in economic experiments, we think that the real-eﬀort setting in our experiment is more infor-
mative than the eﬀort-choice game. First, given the evidence on earned versus windfall money
in dictator-like experiments, voluntary sharing is more costly for the agent in the real-eﬀort
game, as it involves own work (for an extreme example, see Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren,
2002). Thus, agents completing a real-eﬀort task may be less inclined to share what they earn.
Second, the strategy method forces the subjects to make their decisions cold. Therefore, the
agent’s eﬀort reaction to, in particular, sensation might not be properly revealed. Emotions are
likely to play a larger role in decision making when real eﬀort is involved (Charness, Frechette
and Kagel, 2004), so we can examine the eﬀect of control sensations on sharing decisions in this
context. In general, we expect our setting in the real-eﬀort game (reward for the agent only
after successfully completing a task; feedback on the principal’s control decision before the agent
decides on sharing) to be closer to principal-agent relations in real-world organizations.18
Belief Elicitation
To assess the role of sensation in shaping the agents’ behavior, we elicited subjective control
beliefs. The agents had to report their perception of the likelihood of each possible control level
available for the principal to choose. We also asked the principals to state their beliefs regarding
the agents’ control expectations (second-order beliefs). We did not incentivize these answers
because there is evidence that eliciting beliefs with or without incentivization for accuracy does
not yield diﬀerent results (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Grether, 1992).19
After having completed all of the tasks, the subjects were informed of their payment. The
payoﬀ-relevant stage was chosen at random. Then, subjects were asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire
in return for an additional €1. Furthermore, they received €2.50 for arriving on time for the
experiment.
18When making inferences on the agent’s eﬀort in response to control, we only look at his sharing decisions
and ignore the actual performance in solving summations. We do so to ensure that eﬀort is still fully under
volitional control (Van Knippenberg, 2000), just as in the eﬀort choice game.
19Gaechter and Renner (2010) carry out a public-good game and ﬁnd that incentivized beliefs are more accurate
there. However, incentivization has the (undesirable) side eﬀect of increasing the subjects’ willingness to
cooperate.
11Questionnaire
In the questionnaire, besides the standard demographic observations, we elicited subjects’ at-
titudes toward control, employing the questions already used by Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and
Ploner, Schmelz and Ziegelmeyer (Forthcoming). In particular, subjects were exposed to dif-
ferent work-place scenarios. For each of these situations, we asked subjects about their work
motivation.
Implementation
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the computer
laboratory at the University of Jena. Subjects were recruited via the ORSEE online recruit-
ment system (Greiner, 2004). In total, 330 subjects participated in the experiment, primarily
undergraduate students at the University of Jena. One experimental session lasted an average
of 45 minutes. The average payoﬀ was €8.70, which is roughly equivalent to the hourly wage of
a local research assistant. The maximum (minimum) payoﬀ was €16.30 (€2.50).
4 Results
4.1 Eﬀort-Choice Game
Performance We begin by examining the agents’ eﬀort decisions by group and control level.
Our ﬁrst result is that we ﬁnd support for Conjecture 1. For both in-group and no-group
agents, we observe zero and positive voluntary sharing at all control levels. Judging by Chi-
square tests20, the proportion of agents choosing to share more than the minimum requirement
imposed by the principal signiﬁcantly diﬀers between groups for maximum control (No control:
p = 0.336; Min 6: p = 0.200; Min 21: p = 0.022). This is according to Conjecture 3, which
predicts that in-group agents are more likely to voluntarily share their endowment with the
principal than no-group agents.21
Next, we turn to the intergroup diﬀerences in voluntary eﬀort, depicted in Figure 1.22 We
20We report the results of two-sided tests throughout the paper.
21However, the mere fact that the agents and principals had interacted before the eﬀort-choice game may not
have always been suﬃcient to render group identity salient. Recall that after the coordination game, both the
principal and the agent are asked how fair they ﬁnd the actions of their partner. We deﬁne group induction
as successful if the agent’s rating is either 4 or 5. Excluding the 14 in-group principal-agent pairs for whom
group induction can be expected to have not worked properly, we ﬁnd that Conjecture 3 is supported for both
medium and maximum control. The respective Chi-square test statistics read: No control: p = 0.984; Min 6:
p = 0.088; Min 21: p = 0.003.
22Table 4 in Appendix B contains the average and the median values of both the agent’s voluntary performance
and his beliefs.
12ﬁnd that voluntary sharing decreases in the degree of control. This holds for both in-group and
no-group agents. Consistent with Conjecture 4, however, no-group agents’ average voluntary
sharing is signiﬁcantly lower than in-group agents’ sharing at all levels of control. This indicates
that belonging to a social group entails behavioral consequences. The size and signiﬁcance level
of the treatment diﬀerence is largest when the principal trusts the agent completely. Comparing
low and high control, the order of magnitude of the intergroup diﬀerence in voluntary sharing
remains roughly constant. These ﬁndings are, in general, in line with Dickinson and Villeval
(2008), although they do not split their results by control level.23










































Note: This ﬁgure shows the average voluntary sharing (deﬁned as an agent’s contribution beyond the principal’s
minimum requirement) for the three diﬀerent control levels by group. There are signiﬁcant intergroup diﬀerences
in voluntary sharing for all control levels (Mann-Whitney test, No control: p = 0.004; Min 6: p = 0.063; Min
21: p = 0.018).
Interestingly, the eﬀort of in-group agents is often independent of the principal’s control. The
proportion of subjects that share the same amount at all control levels (unconditional sharing)
is approximately two and a half times higher in the in-group than in the no-group treatment
(26.74 percent vs. 10.12 percent; Chi-square test: p = 0.006). Moreover, out of the 23 in-group
agents that shared unconditionally, ten chose to transfer at least half of the endowment (sharing
23For the subsample of those in-group principal-agent pairs for which group induction worked properly, we always
ﬁnd a more signiﬁcant diﬀerence in voluntary eﬀort between in-group and no-group agents than for the full
sample.
13of 58 or more). Only one of the eight unconditionally sharing no-group agents transferred half
of his endowment, while all of the others shared less. In addition, a variance ratio test shows
that the variance of voluntarily expended eﬀort is higher for agents in the in-group treatment
for each level of control, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for both no and maximum control (No
control: p = 0.006; Min 21: p = 0.002) and signiﬁcant at 5 percent for the intermediate level of
control (p = 0.030).
Comparing the cumulative distribution functions of voluntary sharing, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between groups at all control levels. This further strengthens the above results from
the Mann-Whitney test. In the no control condition, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
distributions of the two agent types are the same at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, p = 0.007). In the cases of low and high control, we can reject the equality of
distributions at a signiﬁcance level of 10 percent (Min 6: p = 0.096; Min 21: p = 0.056).
Moreover, we ﬁnd that voluntary sharing under lower control levels ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates the sharing increment under higher control levels for both agent types.
Beliefs Figure 2 shows that agents who had previously interacted with the principals believe
no control to be signiﬁcantly more likely and maximum control to be signiﬁcantly less so than
agents without prior experience with the principals.24 The perceived likelihood of facing low
control does not diﬀer between the two treatments. A comparison of the cumulative distribution
functions of the agents’ control beliefs conﬁrms these ﬁndings. For no and maximum control, we
can reject the null that the distributions of both agent types are similar at the 5 percent level
(Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, No control: p = 0.026; Min 21: p = 0.031). For the intermediate
control level, we do not observe intergroup diﬀerences in the beliefs (p = 1.00).
24When assessing reactions to beliefs, a serious concern is the presence of the so-called false consensus eﬀect
(Ross, 1977). We will, therefore, not speculate on the magnitude of the eﬀects but concentrate on the treatment
diﬀerences, as the false consensus eﬀect should not diﬀer between treatments.



























Note: This ﬁgure illustrates no-group agents’ vis-à-vis in-group agents’ perceived likelihood that their principal
will choose no control, low control, and high control, respectively. Average beliefs are presented. We observe
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between groups in the No control and Min 21 conditions (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.016
and p = 0.010). Beliefs do not diﬀer by group in the Min 6 condition (p = 0.886).
Thus far, we have looked at the distributions of the agents’ subjective control beliefs. To link
the experiment to the theoretical model, however, we need to deﬁne the individually expected
level of control, ˆ m. We regard the control level that the agent believes is most likely to occur,
that is, the mode of the control beliefs, as an appropriate representation of ˆ m. In particular,
we ﬁnd it unlikely that subjects base their decisions on the expected values of their beliefs, as
this would require cumbersome calculations.25 According to Conjecture 5, no-group members
expect a higher degree of control than their in-group counterparts. We ﬁnd support for this
hypothesis in the data. The average (median) value of modal control beliefs is 10.59 (6) for
in-group agents and 15.08 (21) for no-group agents. This diﬀerence in modal control beliefs is
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.003). The equality of the cumulative
distribution functions of the agent types’ modal control beliefs can be rejected at the 5 percent
25We are aware that relying only on the modal belief as the agent’s control reference point means that we neglect
the “strength” of the mode. Recall that beliefs are elicited by asking the agents to attach a likelihood to
each possible control level. When using modal control beliefs, we treat an agent who thinks that he will face
the maximum degree of control with probability 100 percent the same as an agent who believes that he will
face the maximum level of control with probability 34 percent (the latter is the “weakest” modal belief in
our speciﬁcation with three control levels). Therefore, we also used the expected value of control beliefs as an
approximation of the agent’s individually expected level of control. This alternative speciﬁcation leaves all of
our main results unaﬀected.
15level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.016).
In summary, the results in the eﬀort-choice game suggest that a shared experience in the
coordination game has cognitive and behavioral implications. In-group agents perceive the
likelihood of being controlled diﬀerently than their no-group counterparts and are willing to
share more with their principals. Moreover, in about one quarter of all cases the eﬀort of in-
group agents was independent of the principal’s control, while we observed such unconditional
sharing only for every tenth no-group agent.26
Principal
Control We ﬁnd intergroup diﬀerences in the principals’ control decisions. As can be seen in
the upper panel in Table 1, the proportion of principals deciding to control is signiﬁcantly higher
in the no-group than the in-group treatment (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.060).27 In particular, only
5 percent of the no-group principals decide to trust the agent completely, while this percentage
is more than three times higher for in-group agents (approximately 16 percent). This diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.025). The occurrence of treatment
eﬀects in the principals’ implementation of control is even more striking considering that the
variance of in-group agents’ sharing decisions is signiﬁcantly higher than for no-group agents.
This holds for all control levels, implying that suﬃciently risk-averse principals should control
in-group agents to a greater degree than no-group agents.
Second-order beliefs The principals’ second-order beliefs are consistent with the agents’
actual beliefs. As shown in the middle panel in Table 1, in-group principals ﬁnd it more likely
than no-group principals that their agents do not expect any control from them, while the
opposite is true for the second-order beliefs regarding maximum control. For the intermediate
level of control, we do not observe a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect. Further, only two no-group
principals think it is most likely that agents believe that they will not face any control, while
16 in-group principals perceived no control as the agents’ modal belief (Fisher’s exact test, p =
0.001). The frequency of principals who think that low or high control are the agents’ modal
26Similar to Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and in contrast to Ploner, Schmelz and Ziegelmeyer (Forthcoming), we ﬁnd
that under certain conditions the hidden costs of control are substantial enough to undermine the eﬀectiveness
of control. Compared to no control, eﬀort is lower when the principal imposes a control level of 6. This is the
case for both in-group and no-group agents (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.001). In the case of maximum
control, agents’ eﬀorts do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the no control case (p = 0.168 for in-group and p =
0.306 for no-group).
27However, in contrast to the our ﬁndings for the agents, it does not make a diﬀerence in the comparison of in-
group and no-group principals’ control choices whether group induction in the pre-game phase can be expected
to have worked well. The p-value of Fisher’s exact test of the treatment eﬀects in the principals’ control
decisions is 0.060 for both the total sample and the subsample of principals with coordination satisfaction
greater than 3.
16belief does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between treatments (Min 6: p = 0.198; Min 21: p = 0.406).
Finally, the lower panel in Table 1 compares the principals’ second-order beliefs with the
agents’ control beliefs. Both no-group and in-group principals understate the agents’ perceived
probability not to face any control. However, judging by Mann-Whitney tests, this “mistake”
seems to be more serious for no-group principals (no-group: p = 0.007; in-group: p = 0.063).
No-group principals also fail to correctly anticipate the agents’ beliefs regarding medium control
(p = 0.012). The second-order beliefs of in-group principals, however, are statistically indistin-
guishable from the agents’ actual beliefs (p = 0.135). For maximum control, both principal types
have correct second-order beliefs (no-group: p = 0.710; in-group: p = 0.167). In summary, in-
group principals are somewhat better able to anticipate the agents’ actual beliefs than no-group
principals. This is the consequence of the interaction in the initial coordination game, which
apparently allowed the principal to gather information on the characteristics of their agent.
17Table 1: Eﬀort-choice game: Principals’ actions and second-order beliefs by group
Principal
Control decision No-group In-group Total
No control 4 14 18
Min 6 24 21 45
Min 21 51 51 102
Total 79 86 165
Fisher’s exact test, p-value: 0.060
S.O. belief No-group In-group Diﬀ.
No control Average 11.43 23.76
-12.33***
Median 10 20
Min 6 Average 32.51 28.04
4.47
Median 30 30
Min 21 Average 56.06 48.21
7.85*
Median 55 50
Are S.O. beliefs “correct”? No-group In-group
No control no no
Min 6 no yes
Min 21 yes yes
Observations: 165 principals
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of the principals’ control decisions and beliefs in the eﬀort-choice
game, diﬀerentiated by group treatment. Control decisions are given as counts. The beliefs of the principal are
the second-order beliefs over the control beliefs of the agents. Hence, the means of the second-order beliefs add
up to 100 (disregarding rounding errors). Beliefs are compared using a Mann-Whitney test, while the diﬀerences
in the averages between no-group and in-group principals are shown: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Second-order beliefs are “correct” if the Mann-Whitney test does not reject the hypothesis that the agents’
control beliefs and the principals’ corresponding second-order beliefs are the same (p > 0.1). The distributions
of the counts are tested for intergroup diﬀerences with Fisher’s exact test.
4.2 Real-Eﬀort Game
In this section, we investigate how belonging to a social group aﬀects the agents’ decisions in a
real-eﬀort experiment.
18Performance Regarding Conjecture 1, we observe both in-group and no-group agents who
decide to transfer only what the principals force them to share, while there is voluntary sharing
as well. Moreover, the intergroup diﬀerence in the proportion of agents deciding to exceed the
minimum requirement set by the principal is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (Chi-square test,
p = 0.008).28 This result provides support for Conjecture 3.
In Figure 3, we depict voluntary sharing in the real-eﬀort game by group.29 Pooling across
control levels, we ﬁnd that the average voluntary eﬀort is two and a half times greater for in-
group than for no-group agents (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.002).30 Moreover, similar to our
ﬁndings from the eﬀort-choice game, at any level of control, agents who had a shared experience
with their principals in the coordination game transfer more voluntarily than agents who had no
prior interactions with their principals.31 When comparing the cumulative distribution functions
of agents’ sharing behaviors, we can reject the null that the in-group and no-group agents’
distributions are the same at the 1 percent level (Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, p = 0.009).
28We observe a similar test statistic when excluding the 14 principal-agent pairs that were not able to produce
a satisfactory result in the coordination game.
29Table 5 in Appendix C provides the average and the median values of the agent’s voluntary eﬀort and his
beliefs.
30In the subsample of principal-agent pairs for whom group induction worked properly we again ﬁnd somewhat
stronger results. In-group agents that evaluated their partner’s behavior as fair or very fair (feedback of 4 or
5) share, on average, three times as much voluntarily as no-group agents (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.002).
31However, as the number of in-group and no-group observations diﬀers for each control level (see middle panel
in Table 5), it may be misleading to analyze treatment eﬀects by the level of control.


































Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the agent’s voluntary sharing in the real-eﬀort game. Sharing here means the
percentage of total earnings in the real-eﬀort task that the agent chooses to transfer to the principal. The agent
makes this decision before the real-eﬀort game is played.
Beliefs Our ﬁndings regarding the agents’ beliefs also match the previous results from the
eﬀort-choice game well. We observe signiﬁcant treatment diﬀerences in the beliefs for no and
maximum control, while the beliefs are statistically indistinguishable between groups for inter-
mediate levels of control (Figure 4).32 Regarding the cumulative distribution functions of control
beliefs, however, the agents only diﬀer signiﬁcantly for maximum control (Kolmogrov-Smirnov
test, p < 0.000).
32Excluding those in-group agents for whom group induction can be expected to have not worked properly does
not change the results.





























Note: In this ﬁgure, we depict the agents’ beliefs regarding the various control levels that the principals may
choose. Average beliefs are shown. In-group agents expect their principals to trust them completely signiﬁcantly
more often than their no-group counterparts do (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.076), and expect to face maximum
control signiﬁcantly less frequently (p = 0.002). There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for intermediate levels of
control (Min 10%: p = 0.416; Min 20%: p = 0.831).
Next, we turn to the modal control beliefs, which are our experimental equivalent for the
individually expected level of control, denoted by ˆ m in the model.33 As in the eﬀort-choice
game, we again ﬁnd that no-group agents have greater control expectations than their in-group
counterparts, supporting Conjecture 5. On average, no-group agents ﬁnd a control level of 31.91
the most likely, which is signiﬁcantly higher than in-group agents’ average modal control beliefs,
22.05 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.001). The respective medians are 40 for no-group and 20 for
in-group agents. The distributions of in-group and no-group agents’ modal control beliefs are
diﬀerent at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.001).
Sensation We now investigate the agent’s reaction to sensation, which we refer to as the
deviation of the agent’s modal control belief from the experienced level of control. Figure 5
3314 agents (six no-group and eight in-group agents) did not regard any of the four control levels as the most
likely to occur. For these subjects we could not identify modal beliefs. Thus, our below analysis of modal
beliefs and sensation is only based on 151 observations.
21presents the distributions of sensation for the two types of agents. It becomes apparent that
the strong treatment diﬀerences in the individual control beliefs discussed above also translate
into diﬀerences in sensation. In particular, we ﬁnd that no-group agents, on average, face higher
sensations. Interestingly, the average value of in-group agents’ sensations is negative (-5), while
no-group agents experience positive sensations on average (2.05). The intergroup diﬀerence of
sensation is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.023). Concerning the
respective cumulative distribution functions, we can reject similarity between agent types at a
signiﬁcance level of 10 percent (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.058).








































Note: This ﬁgure shows the histograms of the experienced sensation (diﬀerence between expected and realized
control) by group. The bars indicate the proportion of the agent population that face a sensation of size i.
Underlying this ﬁgure are 151 agent observations because 14 agents did not regard a single control level as the
most likely to be chosen by their principals. For these subjects a measure for sensation could not be constructed.
Next, we focus on the question whether the behavioral reaction to sensation is diﬀerent be-
tween groups. Before we come to the regression analysis, we show the agents’ sharing responses
to sensation graphically in Figure 6. Some results are noteworthy. First, in the absence of
any sensation, there is almost a 10:1 diﬀerence in the inclination for voluntary sharing between
agent types. On average, in-group agents voluntarily share approximately 10.7 percent of their
earnings if there is no sensation, while the voluntary sharing of no-group agents is only slightly
22more than 1 percent in this case (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.001). Second, support for Con-
jecture 2 comes from the observation that all sensation-response functions are positively sloped.
Third, as suggested by Conjecture 4, in-group agents share more voluntarily than their no-group
counterparts at any level of sensation.
Moreover, the graph illustrates that Conjecture 6 is also supported by the data, and it reﬁnes
Conjecture 7. Considering negative sensations (actual control exceeds the agent’s expectation)
plotted in the left panel in Figure 6, the drop in the sharing increment is more pronounced for
in-group than for no-group agents. Because the intergroup gap in voluntary sharing shrinks in
the negative sensation, there is almost no diﬀerence between agent types at the minimum level
of sensation, -40. The picture is reversed for positive sensations (actual control is lower than the
agent’s expectation), depicted in the right panel in Figure 6. Here, the reciprocal reaction to
sensations is stronger for no-group than for in-group agents. At the maximum level of sensation,
40, little diﬀerence in the level of voluntary sharing between groups remains.
Although we had no theoretical predicition on the direction of the treatment eﬀect for positive
sensations, a possible explanation for our ﬁndings in this regard is intention-based reciprocity
(Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). As there is more uncertainty about the
agents’ propensities for acting selﬁsh in the no-group treatment than in the in-group treatment34,
imposing loose control is a risky option particularly for the no-group principal. Hence, a no-
group agent, being aware that the principal cannot know his type, may be more likely to consider
a low level of control as a kind action, which he then reciprocates (von Siemens, 2011).

































































Note: This ﬁgure presents linear ﬁtted graphs of the relationship between sensation and voluntary sharing. We
use data for positive (right panel) and negative (left panel) sensations to construct the ﬁgure. Zero sensations
are extrapolated. This ﬁgure is based on 151 agent observations. See Figure 5 for details.
The eﬀect of sensation on voluntary sharing is more rigorously investigated in Table 2. Be-
34The intergroup diﬀerences in the principals’ abilities to correctly anticipate the agents’ control beliefs, displayed
in Tables 1 and 3, are consistent with this argument.
23cause our dependent variable, voluntary sharing (Voluntary), can only take nonnegative integer
values and displays signs of over-dispersion (see table for formal tests), we perform negative
binomial regressions.35
Table 2: Negative binomial estimates of the eﬀect of sensation on voluntary sharing by groups














In-group × neg. sensation 0.057∗∗
(0.028)
Observations 151 151 151
Wald chi-squared 128.95 164.62 203.79
Prob > chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
alpha 1.707∗∗∗ 1.617∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.174) (0.179)
χ2 for alpha=0 1725.632∗∗∗ 1470.375∗∗∗ 1348.030∗∗∗
Note: This table reports the results of negative binomial regressions of sensation on voluntary sharing by group.
Sensation is measured as the diﬀerence between expected and actual control, with expected control being ap-
proximated by the agent’s modal control belief. Because 14 subjects did not have modal control beliefs, the
regressions include 14 fewer observations than in the full sample. In-group is a binary variable, taking the value
of 1 if the principal and the agent played the coordination game at the beginning of the experiment and 0 oth-
erwise. Pos. sensation indicates the level of the sensation if the sensation is strictly above zero. Otherwise,
Pos. sensation equals 0. Neg. sensation is deﬁned accordingly; that is, it exhibits non-zero (and negative)
values if the sensation is strictly below zero. Likelihood-ratio test for alpha (estimated without robust stan-
dard errors) show over-dispersion for all speciﬁcations, which justiﬁes the choice of the negative binomial model.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which are clustered by session, are presented in parentheses.
* z<0.10, ** z<0.05, *** z<0.01.
35Our results remain qualitatively the same under a range of alternative speciﬁcations. For instance, we estimated
the models with a full set of session dummies as additional regressors. We also ran probit and OLS regressions.
24From Column 1, it becomes apparent that voluntary sharing increases in the sensation,
providing support for Conjecture 2. In Column 2, the positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on In-group indicates that in the absence of any sensation, in-group agents share more voluntarily
than no-group agents. The interaction term In-group × sensation allows for treatment eﬀects
in the response to sensation. Due the inclusion of the interaction term, Sensation in Column 2
refers only to no-group agents. Although the positive impact of sensation on voluntary sharing is
somewhat weaker for no-group agents than for the total sample, it is still positive and signiﬁcant.
The insigniﬁcant interaction term suggests that in-group and no-group agents increase voluntary
sharing in sensation equally.
In Column 3, we additionally consider the nature of the sensation. The positive and signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient on Pos. sensation shows that no-group agents voluntarily share more the larger
the (positive) diﬀerence between expected and experienced control. The negative coeﬃcient on
the interaction term In-group × pos. sensation indicates that the eﬀect on sharing of a positive
sensation is less pronounced for in-group than for no-group agents, which reﬁnes Conjecture 7.
Facing a negative sensation, no-group agents do not seem to react in terms of voluntary sharing;
the coeﬃcient on Neg. sensation is insigniﬁcant. However, there is a signiﬁcant interaction
eﬀect. The positive coeﬃcient on In-group × neg. sensation shows that an in-group agent
who experiences a negative sensation decreases voluntary sharing by more than the respective
no-group agent. This result provides support for Conjecture 6. Hence, there are signiﬁcant
treatment diﬀerences in the reactions to sensations, but these are only visible when accounting
for the nature of the sensation.36
Questionnaire Results from the questionnaire provide further evidence that the agent’s re-
lationship to the principal, developed in the initial coordination game, is driving our results on
intergroup diﬀerences. The attitudes toward control generally do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between
the two types of agents.
Principals
Control The principals’ control decisions and second-order beliefs are shown in Table 3. Con-
sistent with the results of the eﬀort-choice game, there are treatment diﬀerences in the principal’s
choice of control (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.094).37 Compared to their no-group counterparts,
in-group principals are more often inclined to choose no or low control. However, it is also
36All coeﬃcients are of the same sign and of a comparable magnitude as those presented above when we exclude
in-group agents who did not provide a suﬃciently positive feedback (rating above 3) on their partners in the
initial coordination game.
37If those principals are excluded from the sample who were not satisﬁed with their partners in the initial
coordination game (rating below 4), the principal’s control choice does not diﬀer between groups (p = 0.164).
25apparent from Table 3 that only 8 percent (3 percent) of the in-group (no-group) principals
decide not to restrict the agent at all, with an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between groups (Fisher’s
exact test, p = 0.171). This result indicates that trusting the agent completely is too risky of a
choice for the majority of principals. It is nevertheless striking that, in relative terms, in-group
principals select no or low control three times as often as no-group principals (6.3 percent vs.
19.76 percent).
Second-order beliefs The middle panel in Table 3 displays that in-group principals expect
their agents to believe that they are not controlled more frequently and maximally controlled
less frequently than no-group principals. There are no treatment eﬀects for the two intermediate
control levels. We also observe intergroup diﬀerences in the modal second-order beliefs. For
instance, only one no-group principal thinks that the agent ﬁnds no control most likely, while
eight in-group principals have this belief (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.034). This is the same 1:8
ratio that we observed in the eﬀort-choice game. The frequency of principals with a modal
second-order control belief of 10 (p = 0.037) or 20 (p = 0.097) also diﬀers between groups (p =
0.395 for maximum control).
The results on the principals’ abilities to correctly anticipate the agents’ control beliefs,
shown in the lower panel in Table 3, are also along the lines of those found in the eﬀort-
choice game. Again, both types of principals tend to understate the agents’ beliefs not to face
any control (Mann-Whitney test: no-group: p = 0.001; in-group: p = 0.083). Moreover, in-
group principals are slightly better in guessing the agents’ control beliefs than their no-group
counterparts. Thus, it appears that the initial coordination game revealed information on the
agents’ control expectations, thereby inﬂuencing beliefs about beliefs.
26Table 3: Real-eﬀort game: Principals’ actions and second-order beliefs by group
Principal
Control decision No-group In-group Total
No control 2 7 9
Min 10% 3 10 13
Min 20% 30 26 56
Min 40% 44 43 87
Total 79 86 165
Fisher’s exact test, p-value: 0.094
S.O. Belief No-group In-group Diﬀ.
No control Average 5.67 15.91
-10.24***
Median 5 10
Min 10% Average 15.42 18.70
-3.28
Median 10 15
Min 20% Average 27.20 24.78
2.42
Median 25 25
Min 40% Average 51.71 40.62
11.09***
Median 50 40
Are S.O. beliefs “correct”? No-group In-group
No control no no
Min 10% yes yes
Min 20% no yes
Min 40% yes yes
Observations: 165 principals
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of the principals’ decisions and beliefs in the real-eﬀort game,
diﬀerentiated by group treatment. See Table 1 for further details.
5 Conclusions
The previous literature on psychology in organizations recognized identity as a powerful concept
to explain individual behavior, for example, promotion decisions (Fajak and Haslam, 1998)
and turnover intentions (Dick et al., 2004; Haslam, 2001). In this paper, we explore the role
of social groups in explaining the behavioral reaction to control in a principal-agent setting.
Incorporating concepts from identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005) into a simple
27analytical framework, we expect an agent who identiﬁes himself with the principal (in-group) to
react diﬀerently to control than an agent without any social ties with the principal (no-group).
In particular, we hypothesize that social identity shapes the agent’s behavior when a control
sensation occurs, where the level of control implemented by the principal deviates from the
agent’s expectation.
We experimentally test the validity of these hypotheses, manipulating the social distance
between the principal and the agent with the help of a coordination game that is played in the
beginning of the experiment. The induction of group membership was evident in the behav-
ioral choices, as in-group agents supply more eﬀort than no-group agents for all control levels
available for the principal to choose. At the same time, in-group agents expect to be controlled
signiﬁcantly less by their principals. The principals meet these expectations; we observe that
in-group principals control less frequently than their no-group counterparts.
However, if the principal’s control exceeds the agent’s expectation, an in-group agent’s per-
formance decreases sharply, while the performance of a no-group agent remains unaﬀected. A
candidate mechanism explaining the pronounced reaction of in-group agents to negative sensa-
tions is the higher emotional signiﬁcance they attach to the principal’s control decision. Thus,
in-group agents are more disappointed than no-group agents if a negative sensation occurs.
Moreover, the intergroup eﬀort gap also shrinks in the positive sensation. No-group agents are
more inclined than in-group agents to increase performance when facing a lower level of control
than the one that was expected. Intuitively, a positive sensation may be interpreted by the agent
as a signal of kindness or trustworthiness, which is more risky to send if the principal and the
agent have never been interacted before. Therefore, a principal revealing himself as a trusting
actor who implements only little control (as compared to the agent’s expectation) may surprise
no-group agents more pleasantly than in-group agents. This greater value no-group agents at-
tach to positive sensations translates into greater willingness to exert eﬀort in the principal’s
interest.
We contribute to the research on the relationship between social identity and work motiva-
tion or task performance. Virtually all previous studies yield evidence in support of a positive
impact of identity on motivational and performance-related factors (for an overview, see Van
Knippenberg, 2000). Little is known about the possible detrimental consequences of identity.
Our results imply that identity determines whether agents punish their principals for control
levels they perceive as inappropriately high. In principal-agent relationships that do not involve
the feeling of belongingness to a group, agents lack the motive to retaliate if their control ex-
pectations are disappointed. In the presence of a shared group identity between the principal
and the agent, however, unexpectedly “bad” behavior by the principal generates the desire for
sanctioning, as it is especially upsetting for the agent. A closer connection between the principal
28and the agent, even when group membership is anonymous, increases the likelihood that control
is interpreted as a sign of distrust and, thus, entails substantial hidden costs. In the long run
with repeated principal-agent interactions, behavior that is regarded as incongruent with the
implied social identity may also corrode previous positive experiences, just as unexpectedly kind
behavior may strengthen social ties. This is a promising avenue for future research.
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34A The Optimization Program
The agent maximizes equation (2) w.r.t. e s.t. e > m, where m is the control choice of the
principal, taken as given by the agent.
max UA (e;m) = g (∆,e) (3)
subject to e ≥ m
The Lagrangian to this problem is:
LA (·) = g (∆,e) + λ(m − e) (4)




0(∆,e) − λ ≤ 0 (e ≥ 0) (5)
∂LA
∂λ
= m − e ≥ 0 (λ ≥ 0) (6)
e
∗ [g
0(∆,e) − λ] = 0 (7)
λ(m − e) = 0 (8)
e,λ ≥ 0 (9)
Rearranging leads to the following conditions:
• e = 0 ∨ g0(∆,e) − λ = 0
• λ = 0 ∨ λ(m − e) = 0
I.) If λ = 0 (the constraint is non-binding)
a) e = 0: no solution since Assumption 3 holds;
b) g0(∆,e) = 0: possible solution.
II.) If λ 6= 0, it follows that e = m: possible solution.
35One solution to the agent’s maximization problem is to not exert eﬀort beyond the minimum
requirement set by the principal, that is, a binding constraint can be optimal (solution II.) ).
In the case of a positive eﬀort increment, solution I.b) determines how the agent responds (in
terms of eﬀort) to changes in the experienced control sensation. We use the implicit function
theorem to derive an expression for the derivative de/d∆ without imposing the functional form









From Assumptions 3 and 4, it follows that de/d∆ is positive.
36B Eﬀort-Choice Game
Table 4: Eﬀort-choice game: Summary statistics of the agents’ voluntary sharing decisions and
beliefs by group
Agent
Voluntary sharing No-group In-group Diﬀ.
if No mon Average 26.65 37.70
-11.05***
Median 23 36.5
if Min 6 Average 16.73 24.30
-7.57*
Median 11 24
if Min 21 Average 7.39 14.48
-7.09**
Median 0 4
Belief No-group In-group Diﬀ.
No mon Average 21.47 32.29
-10.82**
Median 20 25
Min 6 Average 23.96 23.91
0.05
Median 20 20




Note: This table reports summary statistics of the agents’ eﬀort decisions and beliefs, diﬀerentiated by group
treatment. Voluntary sharing is the eﬀort chosen by the agent beyond the minimum requirement imposed by the
principal. The beliefs are the ﬁrst-order beliefs regarding the probability of facing the respective control level.
Thus, the means of the beliefs add up to 100 for each agent type (disregarding rounding errors). Eﬀort levels
and beliefs are compared using a Mann-Whitney test, while the diﬀerences in the respective averages between
no-group and in-group agents are displayed: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
37C Real-Eﬀort Game
Table 5: Real-eﬀort game: Summary statistics of agents’ voluntary sharing decisions and beliefs
by group
Agent





No control 2 7 9
Min 10% 3 10 13
Min 20% 30 26 56
Min 40% 44 43 87
Belief No-group In-group Diﬀ.
No mon Average 14.68 22.24
-7.56*
Median 10 10
Min 10% Average 13.20 15.92
-2.72
Median 10 10
Min 20% Average 21.77 23.05
-1.28
Median 20 20




Note: This table reports summary statistics of the agents’ performance decisions and beliefs in the real-eﬀort
game, diﬀerentiated by group treatment. Voluntary sharing is the share of an agent’s earnings in the real-eﬀort
task that he is willing to transfer to the principal beyond the latter’s required minimum transfer. Notice that
the agent makes his performance decision before he starts to solve the real-eﬀort task. See Table 4 for further
details.
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